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Martin: Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protecting the Shareholder?

NOTE

PLATINUM PARACHUTES:1 WHO'S PROTECTING
THE SHAREHOLDER?
Although golden parachute 2 agreements have garnered a great
deal of attention in the last three years from commentators3 and the
1. Wall St. J., July 18, 1985, at 27, col. 2 (describing a golden parachute which has
such large benefits that "some insiders are calling [it] a platinum parachute").
2. Golden parachutes have been variously defined:
a. "A generous severance package that protects certain key executives if control of their
company changes." Moore & Tilton, Golden ParachuteRestrictions Require Planningon Existing, Proposed Arrangements, 61 J. TAX'N 324 (Nov. 1984) (quoting Justice Arthur J.
Goldberg in a statement he submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of
the Report of Recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Tender Offers);
b. any contract entered into by a corporation with any officer, shareholder, or
highly-compensated individual (including any independent contractor) providing, at
the time of execution, for contingent payments of cash (or property) which are to be
made in the event of a change (or threatened change) in ownership or control of the
corporation (or of a significant portion of its assets).
H. R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 849-50, reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1537-38 (joint explanatory statement of the Committee of Conference
on the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369);
c. "a compensation agreement which provides high level officials of a corporation with
substantial financial remuneration, either in the form of severance payments, benefits, or both,
in the event the corporation experiences a change in control." Comment, Testing the Flight of
the Golden Parachute:Judicial Smooth Sailing or Turbulence Ahead?, 11 N. KY. L. REV.
519, 521 (1984).
This Note suggests the propriety of the following definition: An employment contract entered into by a corporation and an executive stipulating remuneration substantially in excess of
the executive's usual salary and benefits in the event that the corporation undergoes any
change of control, such change creating the presumption that the executive's job is threatened
and entitling him to damages. See infra notes 31, 63-65 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute" Agreements: The Taxman Cuts the
Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45 (1985); Profusek, Executive Employment Contracts in the
Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REv. 99 (1983); Note, Golden ParachuteAgreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in the Wake of a Tender Offer, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 516 (1983);
Note, Golden Parachutes:Executive Employment Contracts,40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1117
(1983)[hereinafter Note, Executive Contracts]; Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business
Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.i. 909 (1985); Comment,
Golden Parachutes:A Perk that Boards Should Scrutinize Carefully, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 293
(1984)[hereinafter Comment, Golden Parachutes];Comment, supra note 2.
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media, 4 the most visible results of such attention have been an attempt by Congress to curtail the most abusive golden parachutes, 5
an increasing amount of litigation involving golden parachutes,6 and
larger and larger golden parachutes.7
Indignation arises not merely from the excessive amount of executive compensation 8 in golden parachutes, but from the fact that
4. See, e.g., Weil & Wood, New Taxes Tarnish Luster of Golden Parachutes,MERGERS
& ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1985, at 54; Byrne, The Agee Legacy, FORBES. Feb. 11, 1985, at 136;
Golden Parachutes May Go the Way of the Dodo, Bus. WK.. Jan. 9, 1984, at 34; Pauly,
Merger Ethics, Anyone?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1985, at 46; Prokesch, Too Much Gold in the
Parachute?,N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 1, col. 2; Hertzberg & Gilman,
Pantry Pride Sweetens Offer for Revlon, Aims to Bar Bergerac 'Golden Parachute,' Wall St.
J., Oct. 8, 1985, at 3, col. 2; Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1985, at 53, col. 3; Schwartz, SEC Favors
'Golden Parachute' Bars, Electronic News, Oct. 29, 1984, at 30, col. 1.
The media has used satire to ridicule the practice of awarding exceptionally large
amounts of money to corporate managers who leave the company and who may have committed egregious business mistakes. See, e.g., Barry, Wall Street Speaks: Triple Witches and
Poison Pills, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, § 7 (Book Review), at 42, col. 2; Trillin, Uncivil
Liberties, Newsday, Oct. 1, 1986, Part II, at 2, col. 3.
5. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67, 98 Stat. 494, 585-87 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 280G, § 4999 (Supp. III 1985) (effective June 14, 1984) [hereinafter
DRA]; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 18040), 100 Stat. 2085 (to be codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 280G, amending (b)(2), (b)(4), (c); adding (b)(5), (d)(5)) [hereinafter TRA].
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
344 (1985); Zimmerman v. Bell, 585 F. Supp. 512 (D. Md. 1984); Smachlo v. Birkelo, 576 F.
Supp. 1439 (D. Del. 1983); Weinberger v. Shumway, Civ. No. 547586, slip. op. (Cal. Super.
Ct. Sept. 19, 1985); Citron v. Ward Burns, No. 7647 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 1985)(LEXIS, Del.
Library, Del. Ch. File); Brandon v. Chefetz, 106 A.D.2d 162, 485 N.Y.S.2d 55 (App. Div.
1985); Prokesch, supra note 4 (shareholders at RCA, Revlon, Beatrice, and City Investing
have brought suit claiming directors failed to exercise sound business judgment in awarding
golden parachutes).
7. See, e.g., ALLIED-SIGNAL INC., JOINT PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS 18-21 (Aug. 9,
1985); BURNUP & SIMS, PROXY STATEMENT 6-7 (July 27, 1984); PULLMAN CO. & PEABODY
INT'L CORP., JOINT PROXY STATEMENT 21-22 (Sept. 30, 1985); REVLON, PROXY STATEMENT

9-11 (Mar. 26, 1985); WARD HOWELL INT'L, INC. 1983 SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
AND "GOLDEN PARACHUTES" AMONG THE FORTUNE 1.000: AN UPDATE OF THE 1982 SURVEY,
Dec. 29, 1983 (available from Ward Howell, 99 Park Ave., New York, New York 10016)
[hereinafter WARD HOWELL]; Morris & Johnson, Case of Indigestion:How Beatrice Adjusts
to Latest Takeover, This Time of Itself, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (seven top
executives at Beatrice received golden parachutes totaling $27.3 million); Prokesch, supra note
4 (Revlon's chairman received $35 million in parachute payments; AMF awarded between
$36.7 million and $50.4 million to its top executives; Union Carbide has $28 million of golden
parachutes).
8. It is clear that in ordinary circumstances the amount of executive compensation is
beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. See. e.g., Spang v. Wertz Eng'g. Co., 382 Pa. 48, 114
A.2d 143, 144 (1955). But see Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941), afrd mem.,
263 A.D. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941):
If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation are they to be
made-executives? Those connected with the motion picture industry? Radio artists? Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States? The President of the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss3/6

2

Martin: Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protecting the Shareholder?

19861

PLATINUM PARACHUTES

by being triggered by a change in control, these agreements are taking advantage of the current flurry of merger and acquisition activity9 to compensate corporate officers beyond what their services
would normally command.' 0 Adding fuel to the fire, the commentary
surrounding these awards suggests that they have been granted at

the behest of corporate officers without any element of good faith
bargaining."
This Note will first look at federal attempts to control excessive
golden parachutes. 2 It will then demonstrate that courts possess established doctrines to protect shareholders properly, namely, the rule

that unreasonably large stipulated damage clauses are unenforceable
as penalties'3 and the rule that corporate expenditures for no consid-

eration constitute corporate waste.' 4 In connection with these legal
remedies, obstacles to shareholder challenges of golden parachute
payments will be considered.' 5

This Note concludes that excessive compensation to management under the guise of golden parachute protection' 6 causes unwar-

ranted detriment to corporations and their shareholders. In such cirUnited States? ...
Merit is not always commensurately rewarded, whilst mediocrity sometimes unjustly brings incredibly lavish returns ....
Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even grapple with these entangled economic
problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical province. Courts are concerned that corporations be honestly and fairly operated by [their] directors, with
the observance of the formal requirements of the law; but what is reasonable compensation for its officers is primarily for the stockholders. This does not mean that
fiduciaries are to commit waste, or misuse or abuse trust property, with impunity. A
just cause will find the Courts at guard and implemented to grant redress.
Id. at 679-80.
9. Williams, Merger and Acquisition Frenzy to Subside After Record Activity in 1985,
Experts Say, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at B6, col. I (A record $180 billion in corporate
combinations occurred in 1985. The previous record was $122.2 billion in 1984).
10. For example, the annual compensation of the president of the Signal Companies was
$926,663. ALLIED-SIGNAL INC., supra note 7, at 21. When Signal merged with Allied he became entitled to his parachute payments of more than $4 million although he was designated
to be president of Allied-Signal, guaranteed to become chief executive officer within five years,
given a new employment contract guaranteeing him at least $1,100,000 per year in salary, and
benefits equal to or exceeding those he had at Signal, and permitting him to elect "inactive
status" and still receive full benefits and payments. See infra note 104.
11. See, e.g., Geneen, Why Directors Can't Protect the Shareholders, FORTUNE, Sept.
17, 1984, at 28, 29; Pauly, supra note 4, at 46.
12. See infra notes 19-62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 131-208 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.
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cumstances, golden parachutes violate public policy' 7 as well as
contract and corporation law 18 and, therefore, it is proper for courts
to invalidate them.
I.

LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES

The only federal legislation regulating golden parachutes is the
Deficit Reduction Act of 198419 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.20
In the context of abusive golden parachutes, the 1984 Act's significance lies beyond its specific regulatory provisions. 21 By enlisting the
Internal Revenue Service to assist the Securities and Exchange
Commission as a "guardian of shareholder democracy" 22 and by
demonstrating a willingness to step into the regulation of executive
compensation, 23 Congress has made important policy decisions which
should serve as guidelines for courts adjudicating contested golden
parachute contracts.
It is Congress' view 24 that corporate decisionmaking in takeover
situations should not be critically influenced by executives' concern
for their own personal benefit.2 5 Congress concluded that, despite all
the claims advanced by corporations in support of golden
parachutes,26 in many circumstances these agreements do little but
17. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 65-130 and accompanying text.
19. DRA, 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (Supp. III 1985). For a discussion of the Act, see
Krueger, Opportunities and Pitfalls in Designing Executive Compensation: The Effects of
Golden Parachute Tax Penalties, 63 TAxEs 846 (Dec. 1985).
20. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 Stat. 2085 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
280G).
21. See infra notes 36-43, 52, 53, 55 and accompanying text.
22. Moore & Tilton, supra note 2, at 327 (Exhibit 1: The IRS Will Be EnforcingSecurIties Laws).
23. Regulation of executive compensation is an enterprise that has traditionally been left
to the states, Moore & Tilton, supra note 2, at 330, which have traditionally left it to boards
of directors. See supra note 8. See also Krueger, supra note 19, at 847 (The Act is an example
of tax legislation which is not expected to raise revenue, but to change human behavior).
24. DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ON MAR. 21. 1984. S.Prt. 169, Vol.1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
175, 195-96 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter DRA, Sen. Rep.]; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 174, 199-207 (Joint Comm. Print 1984) (commonly known as the Blue Book) [hereinafter Blue Book]. While the Blue Book does not have the weight of committee reports, in the
absence of regulations it may be used as the latest authoritative interpretation of the statute.
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 16-17; JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, H. R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 757, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1537-1542 [hereinafter DRA, Conf. Rep.].
25. Blue Book, supra note 24, at 199-200.
26. See infra notes 98, 102 and accompanying text.
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keep entrenched management in control.27 They discourage acquisitions by increasing the cost to a potential buyer.2" On the other
hand, Congress was also concerned that under other circumstances,
golden parachutes might encourage executives to implement a proposed takeover that would reward them handsomely, although it
might not be in the best interests of the shareholders.2 9 Therefore,
Congress determined that to the extent that golden parachutes either
hinder or promote acquisitions for management's benefit, rather than
shareholders' benefit, they should be discouraged. 30
In addition, Congress was concerned that golden parachutes
"provide corporate funds to subsidize officers or other highly compensated individuals" 31 and that "[f]requently, those payments are
greatly in excess of the individual's historic compensation. 3 2 The
conference committee believed that executives in most large corporations are not undercompensated 33 Therefore, Congress decided that
the tax law should not be used to subsidize excessive golden parachute payments by permitting corporations to take a business expense tax deduction for such payments and a tax penalty should be
34
levied.
Finally, Congress decided to limit these agreements because the
costs of the golden parachutes might ultimately be borne by the
shareholders in the form of a reduced price offered by the acquiring
corporation. "
The 1984 Act discourages abusive agreements by imposing two
penalties. It disallows a business expense deduction to the corporation for any excess parachute payment3 6 and imposes an excise tax
equal to twenty percent of the excess parachute payment on the recipient of such payment. 37 The penalties are triggered if any compensation payment is made to an officer, shareholder, or other highly
compensated individual 8 and such payment (1) is contingent upon a
27.
28.
29.

DRA, Sen. Rep., supra note 24, at 195.
Blue Book, supra note 24, at 199.
Blue Book, supra note 24, at 199-200.

30. Id. at 200.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

DRA, Sen. Rep., supra note 24, at 195.
Id.
DRA, Conf. Rep., supra note 24, at 1540.
DRA, Sen. Rep., supra note 24, at 195.
Blue Book, supra note 24, at 200.
DRA, 26 U.S.C. § 280G (Supp. III 1985).
Id. § 4999.

38. The 1984 Act did not define "highly compensated individual." The term is defined in
the 1986 Act (TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 stat. 2085 (to be codified at 26
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change in corporate control or ownership, and (2) is at least three

times the individual's five-year-average taxable compensation.39 The
1984 Act contains a presumption that any payment made pursuant
to an agreement entered into within one year of a change in control

is contingent upon such a change unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.4 Clear and convincing evidence is also required to
support a claim that the amount treated as an excess parachute pay-

ment should be reduced because the payment is "reasonable com' The 1986 Act
pensation for personal services actually rendered." 41
broadens the parachute exception to include reasonable compensation for personal services rendered on or after the change of
control.42
Under the 1984 Act, payments in violation of any securities law
or regulation, regardless of their amounts, were subject ,to the Act's
penalties. 43 The 1986 Act limits the penalties to payments violating
any "generally enforced" securities laws or regulations and places
the burden on the Internal Revenue Service to prove that a violation
occurred.4
Among the changes the 1986 Act made in the golden parachute
rules were those exempting small business corporations 45 and, under
certain conditions, corporations without "readily tradable" stock.4
These exemptions were effectuated in response to criticism that the
1984 Act was overinclusive 7
The effectiveness of both Acts in achieving Congress' purposes
U.S.C. § 280G(c))) as only an employee who is among the highest paid one percent of the
corporation's employees or, if less, who is among the highest paid 250 of the corporation's
employees.
39. DRA, 26 U.S.C. § 280G (Supp. Ill1985). Under the 1986 Act, in determining
whether a compensation payment exceeds three times the individual's five-year-average taxable
compensation, payments from small business corporations, reasonable compensation after the
change in control, and payments from qualified pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or annuity
plans will not be considered. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 stat. 2085 (to be
codified at 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)).
40, Id. § 280G(b)(2)(C).
41. DRA, 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(4) (Supp. III 1985).
42. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 stat 2085 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
280G(b)(4)(A)).
43. DRA, 26 U.S.C. § 280G(b)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
44. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 Stat. 2085 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
280G(b)(2)(B)).
45. Id. § 280G(b)(5)(A)(i).
46. Id. § 280G(b)(5)(A)(ii).
47. Lear & Bagley, 'Excess' Golden ParachutePayment Specially Taxed, Nat'l. L. J.,
Nov. 4, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
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cannot be determined until regulations are promulgated to deal with
specific situations. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the twenty
percent excise tax and the no-deduction-to-the-corporation provisions 48 will reduce the size of some parachute payments to executives.49 On the other hand, corporations can be expected to develop
executive compensation arrangements that circumvent the Acts' penalties. 50 This possibility is heightened by the 1986 Act's exclusion
from parachute payment treatment any payment made to or from a
qualified pension, profitsharing, stock bonus, or annuity plan. 5' Furthermore, many excess parachute payments will continue to be made
without incurring the Act's penalties because of the grandfather protection given to payments made pursuant to contracts entered into
before June 15, 1984.52 In addition to grandfather exemptions, payments triggered by a change in control but made pursuant to stock
options granted more than one year before a change of control would
be considered "reasonable compensation" and would not be subject
to the Acts' penalties.53 Finally, it is not inconceivable that a corporation's management, threatened by a hostile takeover and not adverse to protecting itself with excessive golden parachutes, would be
willing to forego the corporation's deduction and increase the payments to offset the excise tax.54
While the 1984 Act is clearly underinclusive as described above,
commentators have also criticized it for being overinclusive and illegally extending the jurisdiction of the Tax Court. 5 This contention
48.

DRA, 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (Supp. III 1985).

49. Scovill, Inc., for example, specified in the golden parachute agreements given to the
company's four top executives in January 1985, that they were to be paid 2.99 times the
average of their annual compensation over the past five years. Byrne, supra note 4, at 136. By
limiting the payments in that way, Scovill will be able to deduct the payments as a business
expense and the executives will not incur the excise tax.
50. Johnson, supra note 3, at 63.
51. TRA, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(j), 100 Stat. 2085 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §

280G(b)(6)).
52. DRA, 26 U.S.C. § 4999(e) (Supp. III 1985).
As of the end of 1983, an estimated 25.5 percent of the largest United States companies
had change of control provisions in employment contracts protecting their top executives.
WARD HOWELL. supra note 7, at 1. As long as those contracts are not "amended or supplemented in a manner that provides significant additional benefits to the executive," Blue Book,
supra note, 24, at 206, the excess payments can be made with impunity. See. e.g., ALLIEDSIGNAL INC.. supra note 7 (merger triggering Signal's golden parachutes of approximately $30
million occurred in 1985 but the parachute agreements predated June 15, 1984 and, thus, were
not subject to the Act).
53. Blue Book, supra note 24, at 204.
54. Prokesch, supra note 4, at 28, col. 4.
55. Moore & Tilton, supra note 2, at 330 n.27.
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stems from the Act's provisions that allow the Tax Court to capture
payments pursuant to agreements that violate any state or federal
securities laws or regulations."' Thus, if an employment contract
were successfully challenged for violating state corporation law, for
example, the Tax Court could declare all payments made pursuant
to that contract subject to the Act's penalties." The 1986 Act's limitations5" do not eliminate this problem.
The 1986 Act's fine-tuning of the golden parachute provisions
indicates that Congress is unlikely to make sweeping changes in the
near future. Initially, in 1984, the Securities and Exchange Commission recommended to Congress that federal regulation of change of
control compensation might be required because potential conflicts of
interest between management and shareholders could undermine the
public's confidence in the integrity of the takeover process. 59 In 1986,
however, the Commission reversed its position and unanimously
voted against a proposal to outlaw golden parachute contracts
awarded to corporate executives during takeover negotiations.60 The
Commission's general thrust now is in the direction of self-governance rather than regulation."
The golden parachute provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, as modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, are the only legislative remedy on which shareholders can rely. The Acts and the
Committee Reports demonstrate that certain golden parachute contracts constitute corporate behavior which Congress wants to discourage as a policy matter. The underinclusive and overinclusive defects in the Acts, however, suggest that courts, which can examine
the facts of individual cases, may be the better institution for implementing these policies.
56. Blue Book, supra note 24, at 205.
57. Moore & Tilton, supra note 2, at 327, 330. It might even be argued that the fee of
the lawyer who drew up the contract was an excess parachute payment under the Act. Id.
58. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
59. Statement of John S. R. Shad, Chairman of the SEC, before Hearings of the
House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance Concerning the
Recommendation of the SEC Advisory Comm. on Tender Offers, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
83,511, at 86,678, 86,682 (Mar. 28, 1984).
60. Ingersoll, SEC Seeks to Speed Investor Disclosure of Big Purchases of a Company's Stock, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 36, col. 2.
61. Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1986, at 31, col. 1 (letter to the editor from Joseph A.
Grundfest, Commissioner, SEC); Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1986, at 24, col. 1.
62, But see Krueger, supra note 19, at 848 (holding out the possibility that the poor
design of the statute to accomplish the Congressional purpose might be mitigated by signifi-

cant changes through technical corrections or regulations).
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II.

A.

JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Liquidated Damages or Penalty?

A chief rationale for golden parachutes presupposes employees
of a company that has experienced a change of control are being
unfairly treated in favor of the conquerors of the acquiring corporation.6 a In fact, most golden parachute agreements are not triggered
unless there is an effective, although not necessarily actual, job ter-

mination. 4 The company is, in effect, promising to compensate its
employees if they are no longer permitted to do their jobs because of

a change in control. The benefits thus conferred by golden
parachutes are stipulated damages for breached employment
contracts.

Because the object of the contract remedy system is to provide
compensation, not punishment, for breach,

5

stipulated damage

clauses that are clearly unreasonable are viewed as penalties and are
not enforceable. 66 The two factors which are determinative in distin-

guishing liquidated damages from penalties are the difficulty of accurately proving the loss and, more important, the reasonableness

with which the stipulated sum approximates the probable loss. 67 The
parties' intention either to compensate or penalize is generally irrelevant in determining the clause's validity."
63. Comment, Golden Parachutes,supra note 3, at 249.
64. WARD HOWELL, supra note 7, at 3 (The trigger may be a "material change in
duties," a change in job location, an "inability to carry out duties" or merely the option of the
executive.).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 § 356 comment a (1980).
66. Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123, 133-36 (1858) (stating the contract law as the
principle of just compensation whereby courts will enforce the express stipulations of the parties unless any stipulation is clearly unjust, unconscionable or in the nature of a penalty);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 § 356(1) (1980). See also Jaffe & Jaffe, Stipulated Damage Provisions in France and the United States, 33 AmI. J. COMP. LAW 637, 647
(1985).
67. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 120-21 (1907); Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 F. 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1923); Jaquith, 5 Mich. at 136-37; Callanan Road
Improvement Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 190 Misc. 418, 422-23, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 194,
197-98 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Wassenaar v. Panos, I l I Wis. 2d 518, 529-30, 331 N.W.2d 357, 363
(1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 § 356 comment b (1980).
68. Jaquith, 5 Mich. at 136. The court noted, with great perception, that even though
courts generally profess to base their decisions on intent, "intention is not, and can not, be
made the real basis of these decisions." Id. (emphasis in original). See also Wassenaar v.
Panos, I11 Wis. 2d 518, 530, 331 N.W.2d 357, 363 (1983); Jaffe & Jaffe, supra note 66, at
648.
Courts have indicated their lack of regard for intent by enforcing clauses the parties have
labeled "penalty." See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907);
Blewett v. Front St. Cable Ry., 51 F. 625 (9th Cir. 1892). Conversely, courts have invalidated
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Controversy has arisen regarding the relevancy of actual harm
to the enforceability of a stipulated damage clause.69 Most courts

will not enforce such a clause when there has not been any actual
damage or the damage clearly does not bear a reasonable relationship to the stipulated amount.7 0 For example, if an executive leaves
his company when it merges and immediately secures a similar position with equal or better pay and benefits, it would be difficult to
maintain that a multi-million dollar golden parachute was not wholly
disproportionate to the damage he actually suffered. If an executive
remains with the new company after a change in control, continuing
under the terms of his old contract but triggering the parachute at
his option, principles of compensation, justice, and equity would suggest that the parachute should be unenforceable.7 1 In analogous situations, courts have reached this result. In Norwalk Door Closer Co.
v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co.,7 2 the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held that neither justice nor reason would permit the recovery of
$100,000 in stipulated damages when there had been no actual
harm.7 3 In reaching this result, the court invoked the principles of
justice, fairness, and equity. 4 Similarly, in Fields Foundation, Ltd.
as penalties clauses the parties have labeled "liquidated damages." See, e.g., Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1923); J. Weinstein & Sons v. City of New York, 264
A.D. 398, 35 N.Y.S.2d 530, af'd, 289 N.Y. 741, 46 N.E.2d 351 (1942); Fields Found., Ltd. v.
Christensen, 103 Wis. 2d 465, 309 N.W.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1981). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 § 356 comment c (1980); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. CONTRACTS

565-66 (1977).

69. For a clear discussion of the history and present status of liquidated damage clauses
see Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 862 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Recovery]. See also Sweet, Liquidated Damages In California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84 (1972); Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351; Comment, Liquidated Damages and Penalties Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common Law: An
Economic Analysis of Contract Damages, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 1055 (1978). But see C. McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 150 (1935)(advocating disregarding actual damages and judging reasonableness exclusively at the time of contracting).
70. See, e.g. Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1923); Norwalk Door
Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966); Fields Found.
Ltd. v. Christensen, 103 Wis. 2d 465, 309 N.W.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1981); Caplan v. Schroeder,
56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321, 15 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1961). See also Comment, supra note 69
(concluding that the criterion for enforcing liquidated damage clauses should be reasonableness in light of actual harm); Jaffe & Jaffe, supra note 66, at 670-71 (concluding that judges,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Restatement rely on actual damages to determine the
validity of a stipulated damage clause).
71. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
72. 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966).
73. Id. at 689-90, 220 A.2d at 268.
74. Id.
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v. Christensen,7 5 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that even if
the parties believed at the time of contracting that a breach would
cause harm, the subsequent showing of no harm at breach would
make a stipulated damage clause unenforceable. 76
In two of the most complete court discussions regarding stipulated damage clauses in employment contracts, Wassenaar v. Panos"7 and Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,78 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin noted that the threshold question of the clause's
enforceability should be answered by using a single test of validity:
whether the clause is reasonable under the totality of circumstances
including anticipated and actual injury.79 The reasonableness test
strikes a balance between the policy of allowing parties to bargain
for themselves and the policy against imposing penalties.80 Permitting penalties undermines the compensatory nature of the contract
remedy system."' In addition, it is inefficient to coerce full performance by large stipulated damages when breaching would otherwise
make economic sense.8 2 In discussing these two competing policies,
the court noted that stipulated damages which are much greater
than the actual harm suffered may suggest that there has been unfairness in the bargaining process.8 3 This implication is frequently
justified when golden parachute agreements are given to corporate
officers presently under contract because the agreements often are
not the result of arms' length bargaining." Such a conclusion lends
75. 103 Wis. 2d 465, 309 N.W.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1981).
76. Id. at 476, 309 N.W.2d at 131.
77. 111 Wis. 2d 518, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983).
78. 126 Wis. 2d 349, 377 N.W.2d 593 (1985).
79. Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 526-27, 331 N.W.2d at 361. See also Note, supra note
69, at 879.
80. Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 528-29, 331 N.W.2d at 362.
81. Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 369, 377 N.W.2d at 603.
82. Id.
83. Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 528, 331 N.W.2d at 362.
84. See generally Geneen, supra note 11, at 28.
Nominally, outside directors are elected by the stockholders; actually, in most in-

stances they serve at the pleasure of the chief executive

. .

.It is well known and

accepted that only those men and women who can "get along" [with the chief executive] are elected to the board and stay on it.
One might also ask how independent board members can be if they accept all
the perks heaped on them by the management they are to judge. Isn't there a funda-

mental conflict of interest here?
Id.; Prokesch, America's Imperial Chief Executive, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986 § 3 (Business),
at 25, cols. 3-6 (noting that "nominating committees to choose supposedly impartial outside
directors . . . act as the arm and will of the chief executive, who feeds them names" and that
"[b]oard members have normally grown up in the same culture-even the same country
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weight to the argument that these agreements are unreasonable.

Unreasonableness is also suggested by the lack of difficulty in
proving the executive's loss upon a change in control. The existing
employment contract makes lost wages and benefits easy to assess. A
stipulated damage clause may be used, however, to provide for consequential damages8 5 including injury to reputation, emotional distress, and lost opportunity which are difficult to assess monetarily
and are rarely awarded by operation of law for breach of an employment contract. 88 This does not, nevertheless, negate
the reasonable87
ness requirement in setting the damage amount.
Koenings is of particular interest because the court specifically
declined to treat the case as a "golden parachute case."88 The court

noted in dicta that calling an agreement a golden parachute does not
imply any legal conclusions; it merely describes a particular kind of
employment contract.89 This suggests that courts should not treat
golden parachute contests as cases of first impression, but should
scrutinize them using basic employment contract doctrine.
Commentators recommend a fact sensitive approach in evaluating stipulated damage clauses with the emphasis on reasonableness
and actual damages.90 Even commentators who advocate strict enclubs-as the managers they are expected to oversee, and to come down hard on those managers runs against their nature"). See also Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 83 (1985)(noting the great monetary and non-monetary rewards given to corporate
directors and the fact that directors are hand-picked by the chief executive officer); Schwartz,
supra note 4 (citing Michael R. Klein, head of the A.B.A. subcommittee on civil litigation
under the securities laws).
85. Wassenaar, 11l Wis. 2d at 535, 331 N.W.2d at 366.
86. Smith v. Beliot Corp., 40 Wis. 2d 550, 162 N.W.2d 585 (1968); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 68, at 546.

87. The damage has to be evaluated in its proper context. For example, a change in job
locality for a $40,000 a year employee with a heavily mortgaged home near his place of employment may be financially and emotionally devastating. A similar change for a $1 million a
year corporation president with residences in five states on two coasts, full-time access to corporate jets and untold support personnel, corporate bailout on any outstanding mortgages, and
various other economic and emotional perquisites, should be judged by a very different
standard.
88. 126 Wis. 2d at 360, 377 N.W.2d at 599. The court noted that virtually every golden
parachute was triggered by a change in control. Id. See supra note 2. There was no change,
however, in control provisions in Koenings' contract.
89. 126 Wis. 2d at 360, 377 N.W.2d at 599.
90. See, e.g., Sweet, supra note 69, at 138-39 ("[M]ost American courts will not knowingly enforce a liquidated damages clause where there is no actual damage."); Clarkson,
Miller & Muris, supra note 69, at 375 ("When contracting parties can covertly increase the
probability of breach and when they might have incentive to do so, the courts should closely
scrutinize the relation of the amount of the stipulated damage clause to damages from the
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forcement as the best method for dealing with stipulated damage
provisions recognize the need for courts to curb abuse.91 They suggest resorting to doctrines of fraud and unconscionability and to an
examination of the inequalities in the bargaining process. 92 The foregoing analysis of cases and comments suggests that courts should
uphold a golden parachute agreement as liquidated damages unless a
preponderance of the evidence indicates (1) it was not achieved by
arms' length bargaining, and (2) it is not reasonable under the totality of circumstances using a combined prospective and retrospective
approach with substantial weight given to actual harm. If a golden
parachute agreement cannot withstand judicial scrutiny using these

standards, it should be invalidated as a penalty which is against public policy.
B.

93
The Doctrine of Consideration

Common law requires that there must be consideration in order

for a contract to be enforceable.9 4 Thus, in exchange for a promise, a
legal detriment must be bargained for and suffered.9" Past consideration and good motive are insufficient consideration to make a contract enforceable. 96 These basic concepts must be kept in mind when
breach." (emphasis omitted)); Note, Recovery, supra note 69, at 879 ("The need for a flexible
policy of allowing courts to invalidate a clause that was reasonable when made, but is disproportionate to actual losses, justifies an infringement on the parties' freedom to contract.");
Comment, supra note 69, at 1094 ("[Tlhe requirement that preagreed damages clauses be
reasonable in light of actual harm is preferable to other enforcement policies.").
91. Jaffe & Jaffe, supra note 66, at 671.
92. Id.
93. See generally Riger, Taking a New Look at the Validity of Golden Parachute
Agreements, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 26, col. 1.
94. Bargioni v. Hill, 211 Cal. App. 2d 21, 22, 27 Cal. Rptr. 142, 144 (1962); Baehr v.
Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 258 Minn. 533, 538, 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1960); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 68, at 133.
95. Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 258 Minn. 533, 539, 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1960);
Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 737, 118 A.2d 316, 317 (1955); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO.
supra note 68, at 134-35. Cf. Keith & Hastings v. Miles, 39 Miss. 442 (1860)(since a ward
had a legal duty to obey his guardian, performance of that legal duty was not consideration in
exchange for the guardian's promise to provide free board and tuition); Ruffin v. Mercury
Record Prod., Inc., 513 F.2d 222 (6th Cir.)(Oral promises concerning national advertising and
singing tours were unenforceable because the plaintiffs had a legal obligation under a previously signed written contract and, thus, were giving no consideration for the oral promises.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975).
96. Pershall v. Elliott, 249 N.Y. 183, 163 N.E. 554 (1928); Rose v. Lurvey, 40 Mich.
App. 230, 198 N.W.2d 839 (1972). But see Winter Wolff & Co. v. Co-Op Lead & Chem. Co.,
261 Minn. 199, 205, 111 N.W.2d 461, 465 (1961) (discarding the rule that a separate consideration is necessary to settle a liquidated debt when less than the full amount is accepted by
the creditor); Everlite Mfg. Co. v. Grand Valley Mach. & Tool Co., 44 Wis. 2d 404, 408, 171
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the validity of golden parachute agreements is at issue.
Several reasons are advanced for extending golden parachutes
to present employees already bound by legal obligations. 97 One reason is to reinforce and encourage the dedication of executives to their
assigned duties without their being distracted. 98 As a general proposition, courts have held that when one does what one is already
legally obligated to do, one does not incur detriment and, thus, one is
not giving consideration." Corporate executives have a pre-existing
duty to give the proper attention and dedication to their corporate
duties by virtue of statutes,100 their employment contracts, and/or
basic business ethics. 10 '
A second justification for bestowing golden parachutes is to encourage key executives to remain with the corporation.102 It is alleged that such encouragement benefits the stockholder by assuring
high quality management during a tender offer and, if the takeover
attempt succeeds, in the new company, since the latter will be more
disposed to retain the target's executives than to pay large severance
benefits. 0 3 In fact, however, corporations give their executives
N.W.2d 188, 190 (1969)(holding that no new consideration is necessary to support a modification of an executory contract).
97. See infra notes 98 and 102 and accompanying text.
98. Mutter, Golden Parachutes Come to Publishing, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Apr. 5,
1985, at 14.
99. Keith & Hastings v. Miles, 39 Miss. 442 (1860); Ruffin v. Mercury Record Prod.,
Inc., 513 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975).
100. See, e.g., N.Y. BUs. CORP. LAW § 715(h) (McKinney 1977); REV. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.42(a)(1984).

101. Riger, supra note 93, at 26, col. 4.
102. See, e.g., SCOVILL INC.. FORM 10-K at 43 (1984) ("The key executives will be
entitled to payments under the termination agreements upon the occurrence of a 'change in
control' . . , of the Company, such termination agreements being intended to encourage key
executives to remain in the employ of the Company by providing them with greater security."); BURNUP & SIMS. PROXY STATEMENT 6 (Aug. 28. 1984)("[T]he Company ...
enter[ed] into agreements with twenty-one key employees. . . in an effort to induce them not
to act upon resignations . .

").

The third reason most often given for change of control compensation agreements is their
efficacy as a defensive maneuver to ward off hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Note, Executive Contracts,supra note 3, at 1133-35. Although this is an accepted rationale, Blue Book, supra note
24, at 199, it is unlikely golden parachutes achieve this end or are actually undertaken for this
reason. Scotese, Fold Up Those Golden Parachutes, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at
168, 170 (citing takeover attorneys, Joseph Flom and Martin Lipton). In most agreements the
parachute is triggered whether the change of control is hostile or friendly. WARD HOWELL,
supra note 7, at 3 (In a survey of 560 of the Fortune 1000 companies, among companies with
executive employment contracts with change of control triggers, only 14% define change of
control either as an "election of some number of hostile directors" or as a "hostile merger.").
103. Comment, supra note 2, at 532.
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golden parachute benefits without requiring that in exchange they
remain with the corporation beyond the moment of change in

control. 0
Although there have been no decisions on the issue of whether
golden parachutes constitute corporate waste, analogies can be

drawn to cases in which shareholders challenged other company actions on grounds of corporate waste.
In Michelson v. Duncan,0 5 a stockholder brought a derivative
suit against the Household Finance Corporation, its officers and directors, to set aside a stock option plan granted to key employees.
One of the theories of the case was that options were granted without consideration and, thus, constituted a gift or waste of corporate

assets.106 The Delaware Supreme Court defined the essence of gift as
a transfer without consideration and the essence of waste of corpo-

rate assets as use of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary
purposes. 10 7 The court, overruling a lower court's grant of summary
judgment, held that when waste of corporate assets is alleged and
there are genuine issues of fact about the existence of consideration,
104. See, e.g., SCOVILL, supra note 102; BURNUP & Sims, supra note 102.
In the case of The Signal Cos., for example, a change in control of the corporation was
the only requirement for corporate officers to receive special cash payments, payment of all
outstanding stock options, payment of all unvested restricted units under a stock option plan,
and cash awards for performance targets which had not been met. ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.. JOINT
PROXY STATEMENT-PROSPECTUS 19-21, 122-23 (Aug. 9, 1985). These benefits amount to
about $4 million for Signal's president alone, Meier, Officers at Allied and Signal Will Reap
$50 Million in Cash, Benefits in Merger, Wall St. J.,Aug. 12, 1985, at 2, col. 3; nonetheless
he "may elect 'at his sole discretion' to go on 'inactive' [i.e., perform no duties for the corporation] status, in which case he would still receive his full benefits and payments." Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order at App. A, 12, Weinberger v. Shumway, Civ.
No. 547586 (Super. Ct. Cal. Sept. 19, 1985) (order granting temporary restraining order). In
addition, in the case of Signal, as at most of the largest corporations, the top executives are
already very generously compensated with long-term contracts so no further incentive is
needed for them to stay with the corporation. Wall St. J.,Oct. 8, 1985 at I, col. 5 ("Chief
[e]xecutive pay at the top 100 U.S. industrial companies was a median $869,000 [in 1984].").
This is particularly true in the case of a friendly merger where management is the one that has
orchestrated the change in control and will continue its present role in the new company. In
the Signal example, the Merger Agreement guarantees that
all existing employment contracts of Signal will continue to be honored . . .and
that the existing officers of Signal will continue in their same capacities immediately
following the merger . . . .In addition, employee benefit plans, programs and arrangements shall be provided to Signal officers and shall be "at least as favorable"
as their existing plans.
Weinberger, Application for TRO at App. A, 11-12.
105. 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
106. Id. at 215-16.
107. Id. at 217.
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the court is required to examine the transaction."' 8 The court noted
that even though directors' judgments regarding adequacy of consideration may be statutorily protected from court interference, there
was no such protection when no consideration was alleged. 109
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court similarly precluded summary judgment in Aronoff v. Albanese,1 0 where
genuine issues of fact existed about whether certain corporate transactions were void as gifts or corporate waste. The court cited Michelson in defining gift and waste and then stated that "clearly inadequate consideration invokes the same principles as the absence of
consideration." ' ' The motives or personal benefit of the directors
was also a relevant concern. 1 2 Courts will infer improper motives if
the corporate assets expended were much greater than the benefits
received in exchange."" The court in Aronoff also noted the fact sensitivity of the issue of a gift of corporate assets." 4
In an earlier case, Olsen Bros. v. Englehart,1 5 in which a stock
option plan was upheld when challenged as constituting gifts of corporate assets, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that one of the
fundamental requirements for this kind of transaction was that there
must be a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefit to
the corporation and the value of the options granted." 6
When the enforceability of golden parachute agreements is being contested, among the facts the court should consider are motives,
personal benefits to directors," 17 and the disparity in values between
108. Id. at 223.
the absence of
109. Id. at 224. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 157 (1983) provides that "[i]n
actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors as to the consideration . . . and
the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive." The court found, however, that that section was
meant to protect directors' business judgment when the allegation was no consideration and,
thus, becomes a bar to any claim for relief from corporate waste.
110. 85 A.D.2d 3, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1982).
11l.Id. at 5, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
Generally, mere inadequacy does not make a contract insufficient, warranting recission by
a court. O'Brien v. Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 321, 350 P.2d 1, 10 (1960); Straus v. Madden, 219
Md. 535, 542, 150 A.2d 230, 235 (1959). However, if the inadequacy is extreme or if it is
accompanied by other factors such as bad faith, misrepresentations, undue advantage, fraud,
or other inequitable situations, courts will be inclined to grant relief. Woodard v. Bruce, 47
Tenn. App. 525, 535-36, 339 S.W.2d 143, 148 (1960); Straus, 219 Md. at 543, 150 A.2d at
235; Seaboard Ice Co. v. Lee, 199 Va. 243, 252-53, 99 S.E.2d 721, 727 (1957).
112. Aronoff, 85 A.D.2d at 16, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 245 A.2d 166 (Del. 1968).
116. Id. at 168.
117. Aronoff, 85 A.D.2d at 6, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
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the assets expended and the benefits received."' Most often directors

will have had strong personal reasons for serving the interests of the
corporate officers, and not the interests of the shareholders."' The

same can be said of investment bankers 120 and accountants' 2 1 who
118. Id.
119. Geneen, supra note 11, at 28; supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Directors have good reason to be sympathetic to the desires of corporate officers. The
boards of the nation's 500 largest companies "are filled with CEOs and retired CEOs who
want to mix only with their own." They are also very concerned with maintaining their own
positions on the board. Money is a prime concern. Generally outside directors at the largest
manufacturing firms get about $32,000 a year. "The companies turn themselves inside out for
you [as a director] . . . and you live high on the hog." Perham, How Executives Get on
Boards, DUN's Bus. MONTH, Apr. 1985, at 54.
The directors of The Signal Cos. were getting $45,000 a year. They will continue receiving that fee as either board members of the merged Allied-Signal or as board members of the
wholly owned subsidiary, Signal. ALLIED-SIGNAL INC., supra note 7, at 17, 115, 119. Seven of
Signal's sixteen directors were either management directors or affiliated non-management directors. Id. at 115-17. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1619-20
(Apr. 1978)(defining management directors and affiliated non-management directors).
Signal's chairman of the board testified that the president of Signal negotiated his own
employment contract on behalf of himself and on behalf of Signal. The chairman testified that
he did not know whether anyone else from Signal participated in the negotiation. Ex Parte
Application For Temporary Restraining Order at App. A, 6, Weinberger v. Shumway, Civ.
No. 547586 (Super. Ct. Cal. Sept. 19, 1985) (order granting temporary restraining order).
120. Joint proxy statements relating to mergers typically contain opinions of investment
bankers stating that they have reviewed all the terms and information relevant to the merger
and find it to be fair to the shareholder. See, e.g., ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.. supra note 7, at 11-13;
PULLMAN CO. & PEABODY INT'L CORP.. supra note 7, at 19-21.
The fees earned by investment bankers involved in corporate changes of control are so
large that it would be naive to discount their interest in currying favor with the corporate
officers who hire them and in promoting the takeovers for which they get paid.
The investment banking firm of Lazard Freres received a $10 million fee for the Signal/
Allied combination in 1985. Two years earlier it received a $2.5 million fee for the Wheelabrator-Frye/Signal merger. In 1983 and in 1984, Lazard Freres received at least $2.25 mil-

lion in additional fees from Signal.

ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.,

supra note 7, at 13.

The investment bankers and lawyers involved in the Revlon/Pantry Pride combination are
expected to earn $100 million in fees. Revlon's resigning president will be receiving a golden
parachute estimated at $21.4 million. Hertzberg, Advice in Revlon Brawl Wasn't Cheap, Wall
St. J., Nov. 8, 1985, at 6, col. 1. See also Stewart & Hertzberg, Investment Bankers Feed a
Merger Boom and Pick Up Fat Fees, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 6. Compare Stein,
Investment Banking's Dirty Little Secret, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 2, col.
3, 6 (stating that "the supposedly independent investment bank writing the 'fairness letter' is
entirely in the pocket of management, owes all its loyalty to management and makes the big
bucks only if it helps the deal to go management's way") with Fleischer, Jr., A 'Fairness
Letter' Is Just an Opinion, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 2, col. 3 (defending
the objectivity and expertise of investment bankers in issuing "fairness opinions").
121. Joint proxy statements relating to mergers typically contain statements that the
information therein has been approved by an independent public accounting firm. See, e.g.,
ALLIED-SIGNAL INC., supra note 7, at 142; PULLMAN CO. & PEABODY INT'L CORP., supra note
7, at 97-98.
See also Berton, CPA Firms Diversify, Cut Fees, Steal Clients in Battle for Business,
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offer, and are relied on for, advisory opinions stating that the corporate transactions in question are fair to shareholders. 22 At the same
time, the amount being spent on the parachutes 123 is, in some cases,
so large that the disparity between the parachute and the benefit

received in return is overwhelming. 24 In Rose v. Lurvey, 25 the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the $1.05 paid as consideration
for a property worth $12,000 was so grossly inadequate as to "shock
the conscience of the court" and that this alone mandated the cancellation of the contract. The court explained that grossly inadequate

means that "a man of common sense" or a "conscientious person"
12
would be shocked at the inequality.
Corporate officers have argued that golden parachutes should be
Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1985 at 1, col. 6.
122. See generally Bachelder, Golden Parachutes Revised: II, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 31, 1986,
at I, col. I (advising corporate officers and directors, who have a common interest in having
golden parachutes withstand judicial scrutiny, to seek independent advice and noting cases
where obtaining the advice of investment bankers with significant fees at stake did not satisfy
directors' obligations to obtain disinterested opinions).
123. Among the Fortune 1,000 companies, approximately 62% of the golden parachutes,
as of 1983, contained cash benefits of over $1 million for each covered employee. WARD
HOWELL, supra note 7, at 7.

Golden parachutes where the bargaining aspect is questionable and the amounts qualify
them as "platinum parachutes" include:
Revlon's chairman and chief executive officer, $21.4 million. Hertzberg & Gilman, Revion Officials to Get Payments If Buyout Occurs, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1985 at 10, col. 4.
Bendix's chief executive officer, $4 million. Golden Parachutes May Go the Way of the
Dodo, supra note 4.
Prentice-Hall's president and chief executive officer, $945,000. Mutter, supra note 98.
Peabody's chairman and chief executive officer, $3.7 million. Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1985, at
14, col. 3.
City Investing's chairman, $16.4 million. Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 1984, at 76.
Allied's chairman and chief executive officer, $4.2 million. Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1985, at
2, col. 3. Allied's chairman will be getting his parachute even though he will be remaining as
chairman and CEO at the merged Allied-Signal with equal or better salary and benefits and
the majority of Allied-Signal directors are former Allied directors. Only nineteen months earlier, the chairman was quoted [referring to the elimination of Allied's golden parachutes after
its acquisition of Bendix]: "There was so much adverse publicity generated by the golden
parachutes, we didn't need them." Golden Parachutes May Go the Way of the Dodo. supra
note 4.
124. Prokesch, supra note 4. California Representative Fortney H. Stark, Jr. has commented that "[t]hey [golden parachutes] are outrageous-I can't believe these guys are worth
that kind of money." Id. at 1, col. 1. Leo Herzel, a Chicago attorney, echoed Stark's belief,
stating that golden parachutes are like "throwing money away." Id. at 28, col. 4. Moreover,
Edward H. Bowman, management professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton
School remarked "Nearly three times a guy's salary is adequate. Anything more than that
may border on greed." Id.
125. 40 Mich. App. 230, 198 N.W.2d 839 (1972).
126. Id. at 235-36, 198 N.W.2d at 842.
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validated by virtue of the benefit accruing to shareholders as a result
of a corporate merger.1 27 That reasoning confuses two separate issues. Shareholders' benefit from a merger is probative of management's good faith in approving that merger. It does not address the

charge that management recipients are getting extremely large monetary rewards for which they have given the corporation no more

than they owed under their original employment contracts. In the
Allied/Signal merger, 128 for example, a $12.38 per share benefit to a

stockholder obtained because of the merger 129 may indicate management carried out its fiduciary duty in approving the merger. It does

not, however, establish that corporate officers gave consideration for
$50 million in parachute payments.1 30 In such circumstances courts
should scrutinize the agreements for proof of a genuine exchange
and invalidate golden parachute agreements that lack consideration
and are a waste of corporate assets.
III.

OBSTACLES TO SHAREHOLDERS'

A.

REMEDIES

The Business Judgment Rule

A shareholder who wants to challenge the validity of a golden
parachute agreement may be faced with the defendant corporation's
invocation of the business judgment rule131 as an absolute bar to ju127. Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 13-15, Weinberger v. Shumway, No. 547586 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug.
22, 1985)(Signal Cos. argued in support of its golden parachute agreements that the change of
control precipitating payments under the agreements was clearly in the best interests of the
shareholders and the triggered payments were immaterial to the transaction as a whole.).
128. See supra note 104.
129. The price of a share of Signal stock at the end of 1984 was $32.62. The merger

price was $45.

ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.,

supra note 7, at F-49.

130. Meier, supra note 104.
131. The business judgment rule has been defined:
a. A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his
duty under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested . . . in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of
the corporation.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c)(Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1985).
b. "[A]bsent evidence of self-dealing, conflict of interest, bad faith or fraud, directors of the corporation will be presumed to have exercised their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation, and the courts will respect their
determination." Asarco, Inc. v. MRH Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 473
(D.N.J. 1985).
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dicial scrutiny. An analysis of contract law, 132 as well as an examination of recent cases,133 suggests that the rule should not be a significant obstacle.

The business judgment rule was formulated by courts13 4 to reflect the basic corporate principle that it is the directors, not the
shareholders, who manage the affairs of the corporation." 5 Part of
this basic principle is that the shareholders' remedy for dissatisfaction with management decisions lies in the corporate voting process:
they may vote management out.

36

This principle has been widely

recognized since
is still generally relied on by courts. 38
The business judgment rule traditionally has been merely a
starting point for inquiry into directors' decisionmaking processes,
and not an absolute bar that precludes judicial review.' 39 In the context of a very large volume of merger and acquisition activity 40 and
the concomitant publicity and scrutiny being given to the business
19321a1 and

c. "[The business judgment] rule bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate
directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in lawful
furtherance of corporate purposes." Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F.
Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev. 1985).
132. See supra notes 64-130 and accompanying text (noting that allegations of fraud,
unconscionability, penalty, and corporate waste, inter alia, will be scrutinized by the court).
133. See infra notes 146-75 and accompanying text.
134. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. supra note 131, at 58. But see, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 309 (West
1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986) (both statutes describing the standard

of care to which directors are held, but not defining the business judgment rule).
135. REv. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984).
136. Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985); REv. MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28(a) (1984).
137. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 208-09 (5th ed. 1980). See also
Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 84 Misc. 278, 283, 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1914), an
earlier case suggesting the business judgment rule:
There is merely the assertion of the plaintiffs' disagreement with the directors as to
the expediency of the transaction .

. .

. Because of this diversity of view, the court

is asked to revise the judgment of the directors, and substitute its conclusion for
This is no business for any court to follow."
theirs ....
Id. (citations omitted), affd, In re Jaquish, 163 A.D. 926, 147 N.Y.S. 1118 (App. Div. 1914).
138. See, e.g., Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 1983); Enterra Corp. v.
SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Asarco, Inc. v. MRH Holmes A Court,
611 F. Supp. 468, 480 (D.N.J. 1985).
139. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v.
S.L.& E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980); Otis & Co. v. Penn. R.R., 61 F. Supp.
905, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1945), affd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2,
6 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 100
(1979).
140. Blue Book, supra note 24, at 199.
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a141
decisions of corporate directors and officers,
some courts have
demonstrated a willingness to weigh the desirability of affording
management the protection of the business judgment rule for legitimate business purposes against the undesirability of encouraging
management to engage in defensive and self-dealing tactics that

serve primarily to entrench management and restrain business pur-

poses at the expense of shareholders.1 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, for example, applying New York law, has held that
the business judgment doctrine does not bar judicial inquiry into the
actions of corporate directors when there is a breach of fiduciary
duty which includes both duty of care and duty of loyalty.143 The
exercise of the latter involves avoiding conflicts of interest, fraud,
self-dealing and bad faith. 4

Some in the business community' 45 have acknowledged that the
personal interests of the directors have been an influence on executive compensation and entrenchment of management. In Norlin

Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,146 a case involving a defensive action
taken by Norlin when it feared a takeover attempt, the New York

Court of Appeals, applying New York common law, noted that the
141. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Shumway, Civ. No. 547586, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept.
19, 1985).
142. See, e.g., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), which states:
The business judgment rule is a rule of judicial restraint which holds that courts will
not inquire into the business judgment of directors who are acting without selfinterest and in good faith. As an initial matter we question whether it is appropriate
to apply the rule in the context of defensive tactics. The rule was developed to protect directors' judgments on questions of corporate governance. Questions like
"should we buy a new truck today?" or "should we give Joe a raise?" are simplistically, types of business judgments which the rule was developed to protect. Courts
have no place substituting their judgments for that of the directors.
Defensive tactics, however, raise a wholly different set of considerations. The
problem is that defensive tactics often, by their very nature, act as a restraint on
business purposes. Therefore, the application of the business judgment rule in this
context seems, to us, questionable, however, the weight of authority dictates that the
rule be applied.
Id. at 1259-60. See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)
(applying N.J. law).
143. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273-74 (2d Cir.
1986).
144. Id. See also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. S.L.&E., Inc., 629
F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Ind., 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D.
Nev. 1985); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685-86 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
145. Geneen, supra note 11.
146. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
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business judgment rule can bar judicial inquiry into the actions of
corporate directors only when the directors are shown not to have a
self-interest in the transaction at issue. 147 Self-interest was demonstrated in this case and the court did not hesitate to examine all the
148
details of the contested actions.
In MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 49 the
Delaware Chancery Court held that the Revlon board of directors
did not satisfy the duty of loyalty component of the business judgment rule in fending off Pantry Pride's takeover attack. 150 The board
served its self-interest, not the needs of the shareholders, in its selection of a takeover defense and, thus, its action was not protected by
the business judgment rule." 1 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 15 2 the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Unocal directors had reasonably investigated and therefore acted in good faith
in opposing Mesa's tender offer. Accordingly, the court would not
substitute its judgment for that of the board. 153 The court found,
however, that in a takeover context where the board may be acting
in its own interest, rather than the shareholders' interest, "there is
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."1 54 The court then proceeded to examine the reasonableness
of the board's action to determine if it came within the ambit of the
155
business judgment rule.
Even when a conflict of interest was not at issue, courts have
applied judicial scrutiny when shareholders have challenged management's actions as not being in the corporation's best interests.158 In
Asarco, Inc. v. MRH Holmes A Court,1 57 shareholders challenged
the issuance of a series of stock which would readjust intraclass voting rights. The district court held that, under New Jersey law, the
directors of Asarco kept the presumptions of the business judgment
rule.1 8 Nevertheless, the court held that the directors had the bur147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 265.
Id.
501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1986).
Id. at 1250.
Id.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 955-58.
See Infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
Id. at 480.
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den of showing that their actions were in the best interests of the
stockholders15 9 and the court made a detailed inquiry into the validity of the corporate action under the New Jersey Business Corporation Act. 6 0
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,' 61 the Delaware Supreme Court did
not permit the directors of TransUnion to keep the presumption of
the business judgment rule even though there were no allegations of
self-dealing or bad faith. 62 The court's holding that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty 6 3 to their shareholders when they
voted to approve the Pritzker merger proposal without being adequately informed 64 shocked the business world.'6 5 The business
community had assumed that under these and similar circumstances
the business judgment rule would protect corporations from having
their behavior scrutinized by a court.166
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,16 1 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overruled the district court
and held that Hanson had made a prima facie case showing that
SCM's directors breached their duty of care in approving a lock-up
option of substantial corporate assets in their attempt to thwart Hanson's takeover bid.6 8 Under New York law, SCM then had the burden, which it did not sustain, of justifying the fairness of the lock-up
option.' 6 9 The court held that SCM directors made their decision too
quickly and with too little information to satisfy their duty of care. 70
In addition, the directors did not attain the reasonableness standard
by relying only on the opinions of their attorneys and their invest159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 474-80.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 873.

163. The meaning of fiduciary duty is codified in some states. See, e.g.,
CODE

§ 309 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP.

LAW

§ 717 (McKinney 1986);

REv.

CAL. CORP.

MODEL BUS.

CORP. AcT § 8.30 (1984). In other states, such as Delaware, the standard for fiduciary duty is
set by common law. Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. In Smith, the court restates the Delaware standard as "the concept of gross negligence." Id. at 873.
164. 488 A.2d at 893.
165. Leisner, Boardroom Jitters A Landmark Court Decision Upsets Corporate Directors, Barron's, Apr. 22, 1985, at 34, col. 1; Glaberson & Powell, A Landmark Ruling that
Puts Board Members in Peril, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 56.

166. See supra note 165.
167.

781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).

168. Id. at 272.
169.

Id.

170. Id. at 274.
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ment bankers. 171 The court noted that a director's due care is a prerequisite for satisfying his duty of loyalty. 7 2 In addition, the court
observed that a director's usual review procedure may be inadequate
when he is presented with management decisions in which management has a self-interest. 73 In such situations, directors have a particular duty to protect shareholders because management may not fully
74
represent shareholder interests.
Courts should apply the same kind of analysis in the golden parachute context. To satisfy their duty of care, directors must make an
independent determination that golden parachutes are necessary and
reasonable without indiscriminate reliance on the opinions of management, attorneys, and investment bankers whose self-interest may
preclude them from fully representing shareholders.
These recent cases illustrate not only the courts' sensitivity to
the risks of self-dealing and abuses which are inherent in corporate
decisions involving change of control transactions,175 but also the
courts' willingness to examine the corporate decisionmaking process
before refusing to review the merits of a complaint. 7 Although executive compensation has traditionally been an area in which courts
77
will not substitute their judgment for that of corporate directors,
the circumstances of self-interest, entrenchment of management, and
discouragement of takeovers without proper regard for the corporate
interest surrounding golden parachutes should encourage courts to
go behind the shield of the business judgment rule and to review
78
these agreements.1
B.

ProceduralObstacles

The contract doctrines discussed above suggest that shareholder
171. Id.
172. Id. at 276.
173. Id. at 277.
174. Id.
175. Norlin, 744 F.2d at 255; Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
176. Asarco, 611 F. Supp. at 468; Smith, 488 A.2d at 858.
177. See supra note 8.
178. Cf. Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948):
Courts are properly reluctant to interfere with the business judgment of corporate
directors; they do so only if there has been so clear an abuse of discretion as to
amount to legal waste. . . . [A] triable issue of fact exists as to whether the directors did exercise their honest business judgment or were motivated by the alleged
purpose of favoring the president.
Id. at 662.
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plaintiffs could make persuasive arguments for invalidating golden
parachute agreements. The problem has been that they have not

been able to reach the merits of the cases.
In Brown v. Ferro Corp.,179 the plaintiff-shareholder brought a
derivative suit challenging fourteen golden parachute agreements
given to company executives in response to a perceived hostile takeover attempt.18 0 The plaintiff claimed that the agreements served no

valid business purpose.18 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the claim by the district court by invoking
the ripeness doctrine, 18 2 because the agreements were contingent

upon a change in control which had not occurred and was not presently foreseeable. 8 3 The dissent argued that the majority was misapplying the ripeness doctrine because its application would have "the
plain consequence of eliminating any opportunity to challenge the

legality of the severance agreements through a shareholder's derivative action."''

4

The dissent indicated that an Ohio statute prevented

shareholders from challenging golden parachutes after the change of
control which triggers their payment. 8 5 Thus, under the majority's
decision, the shareholder is barred by the ripeness doctrine from
challenging the parachutes before a change of control and barred by
standing requirements from challenging the parachutes after a
change of control. 8 6
The American Law Institute (ALI) suggests a solution to the
179. 763 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 344 (1985).
180. The agreements provided that if the executive left the company for any reason
within the two years after a change in control, he would receive two or three years' pay,
retirement benefits, and the cash value of all his stock options. The executive would receive his
golden parachute even if a change of control was not hostile, if he was fired for cause, if he
voluntarily resigned, or if he obtained more lucrative employment elsewhere. Id. at 799.
181. Id. at 800.
182. Id. at 800-01.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that "[t]he basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine 'is to prevent courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements'. . . . [T]he question of ripeness turns on 'the fitness of the issues for judicial decision' and 'the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.'" Id. at 801.
183. Id. at 800.
184. Id. at 803.
185. Id. at 804 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.82 (Anderson 1985)). The Brown
dissent found that "a target company's former shareholder had no standing after the target
had become the wholly owned subsidiary of its acquiror to bring a derivative action challenging golden parachutes," analogizing to a "very similar Delaware statute," which was interpreted in Lews v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984). Id.
186. Id.
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problem outlined by the Brown dissent. 187 If a shareholder's interest
is involuntarily terminated by a merger or similar technique and (1)
he had already started an action, or (2) the surviving entity would
not be able to represent fairly the interests of the injured shareholders, then he may be permitted to pursue his derivative action.188
"Any contrary rule might permit a self-interested management to
abort an action it could not otherwise terminate simply by eliminating the minority stockholders through a cashout merger."189
This position was sustained in a California appellate court
which held that "a derivative suit challenging a company's 'golden
parachutes' can be pursued by a plaintiff who no longer owns company stock."' 90 The opinion concluded that "[t]o hold that a merger
has the effect of destroying such causes of action would be tantamount to giving free reign to deliberate corporate pilfering by management and then immunizing those responsible from liability by virtue of the merger which they arranged. This would be a grossly
inequitable result."' 9 ' The court specifically mentioned a Delaware
Chancery Court decision 9 2 imposing a continuous ownership requirement, but noted that California, in contrast to Delaware, followed a "judicial and legislative trend of a liberal and expansive construction of derivative suit standing requirements."' 93 Even
Delaware courts, however, have acknowledged that in extreme circumstances equity would require permitting
a shareholder to main94
tain a derivative action after a merger.
Other difficulties in contesting golden parachute agreements are
illustrated by two suits, Smachlo v. Birkelo'95 and Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.' 98 Both were brought against The El Paso
Company, which gave such agreements to four top executives when
the company was threatened by a takeover attempt by Burlington
Northern, Inc. Smachlo was a shareholder derivative suit alleging, in
187.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

§

7.02(a)(2)(Disc. Draft No. 1, 1985).
188. Id. at 40 (giving the example of a golden parachute where there would be no available legal remedy by which to assert a legally meritorious claim).
189. Id.
190. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 410, 219 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1985).
191. Id. at 420, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 420-21, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
194. Lewis v. Anderson, 453 A.2d 474, 480 (Del. Ch.), affd, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del.
1984).
195. 576 F. Supp. 1439, 1441 (D. Del. 1983).
196. 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984), afid, 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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part, that the golden parachutes constituted a waste of corporate assets and a breach of fiduciary duty.19 7 The case was dismissed because plaintiff failed to satisfy the demand requirement."9 8 Schreiber, on the other hand, was a direct action for violation of the
Williams Act.199 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal because, although failure to disclose the golden parachutes did incorporate a claim of deception, the
nondisclosure was not the cause of the shareholder's damages. 00
The possibility of collusive settlements in derivative suits must
also be recognized.2 01 The derivative suit loses its potency as an effective shareholder remedy if corporate management is simply able
to add something extra to its golden parachutes to offer plaintiffs'
attorneys an "incentive" to procure a settlement in a suit challenging
the payments. 2 Courts must be vigilant in considering the adequacy
and fairness to shareholders of proposed settlements.
A class action may also be brought to invalidate golden
parachutes. In Brandon v. Chefetz, 20 3 the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, reversed a lower court and ruled that
plaintiffs were proper class representatives, even though one plaintiff
had a personal interest in the case and the other was not well informed about the case. 20 4 The plaintiffs charged the defendants 20 5
197.
198.
199.

576 F. Supp. at 1441.
Id. at 1445.
731 F.2d at 163; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), as amended, 15

U.S.C.A. § 78n(e)(1976) (prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices
in connection with a tender offer).
200. Id. at 166 (The losses were caused by Burlington's decision to withdraw its December offer for El Paso stock, not by Burlington's alleged nondisclosure in January.).
201. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiffas Monitor in ShareholderLitigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 32-33 (1985).
202. Shareholder suits challenging golden parachutes are becoming commonplace, but

they are frequently settled out of court. Prokesch, supra note 4, at 1, col. 4.
The executives at Signal Cos. were awarded parachutes of approximately $30 million. See

supra note 52. The proposed settlement of the shareholder suit challenging those parachutes
would reduce them to approximately $18.2 million and would award plaintiffs' attorneys $3.5

million in fees and costs. Weinberger v. Shumway, No. 547586 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 27,
1985)(notice of proposed settlement of derivative action and hearing thereon). The result of
the litigation would, thus, be to save the corporation and its shareholders approximately 28%
of the payments being challenged as corporate waste.
203. 106 A.D.2d 162, 485 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1985), rev'g 121 Misc. 2d 54, 467 N.Y.S.2d

312 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
204.

Defendants opposed the motion for class action certification because Brandon was a

friend of two of the corporation's directors and was very familiar with the corporation's compensation arrangements. Sippel, on the other hand, allegedly had never read the tender offer

and was totally unfamiliar with the actions being challenged. Notwithstanding this, the court
ruled they could adequately represent the class. Id. at 165, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
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with a breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment because the
president and the chairman of Wells Management Corporation were
given golden parachutes worth at least $1,250,000 when a tender offer was made by BIS, S.A.206 Thus, the president and the chairman
were given $10.33 per share, while all other shareholders received
only $5.00 per share.20 7 The case was remanded to the lower court.
In general, the difficulty with bringing class actions is that
plaintiffs must prove that shareholders actually received less for their
shares because of the parachute payments. In a billion dollar merger,
it would be difficult to prove the significant per share financial impact of several million dollars in parachute payments.20 8
The derivative suit is the most appropriate device for shareholders to protect themselves against abusive golden parachutes which
harm the corporation. When the facts of the case indicate the suit is
not frivolous, the courts should not leave shareholders without a
remedy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In reality, shareholders and the corporation are not protected by
normal corporate procedures when top corporate officers award
themselves unearned multi-million dollar golden parachutes.
When golden parachutes are contested, courts should not afford
them automatic protection behind the business judgment rule 20 9 or
derivative suit rules.210 Courts should examine the facts surrounding
the making of each agreement and, applying a reasonableness test,
determine whether executives have bargained for the terms therein
or have unilaterally granted them to themselves. Courts should inquire whether executives have given any consideration for the agreements beyond that given for their existing employment contracts and
whether the stipulated damages approximate the actual damages.
If courts act with firmness, they can accomplish four desirable
results: (1) deterring corporations from attempting to abuse golden
parachutes 211 and, thus, reducing the need for courts to make business decisions; (2) eliminating the need for additional federal legisla205.

The defendants were the president and the chairman of the takeover target and the

acquiring company, but not the takeover target itself.
206.

106 A.D.2d at 164, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 57.

207. Id.
208.

Nat'l L. J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 42, col. 4.

209. See supra note 131.
210.
211.

See supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
Prokesch, supra note 4, at 28, col. 5.
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tion which would probably be underinclusive and overinclusive as to
the facts of specific cases;212 (3) protecting shareholders when they
cannot protect themselves because existing mechanisms are inadequate; and (4) maintaining confidence in the corporate system whose
213
integrity is challenged by highly publicized "platinum parachute
excess.
Susan L. Martin

212.
213.

See supra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1.
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